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1 Introduction
Moorestown and Haddonfield are two U.S. towns that are in many respects similar: They are
located near each other in the greater Philadelphia metropolitan area (south New Jersey), are
aﬄuent with very good school districts, and are predominantly residential. But they also diﬀer
in one important aspect: Haddonfield’s main street oﬀers a better selection of restaurants and
shopping areas than Moorestown’s main street does. This better selection of shopping areas in
Haddonfield has two, and closely related, eﬀects on the economic activity there. Firstly, given
that shoppers value, in general, variation in shopping areas, Haddonfield is attracting shoppers
from many neighboring towns (including Moorestown). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly,
the higher shopper traﬃc into Haddonfield results in even more (and of higher quality) businesses
being attracted by this town, which, in turn, attracts even more shoppers in the Haddonfield
area. An explanation for the lack of shopping variety in the Moorestown area that is frequently
given is that Moorestown is expensive relative to Haddonfield, in terms of all the fees/taxes, to
start-up business, and relative to the public infrastructure being oﬀered in the respective towns.1
Though the previous example originates from U.S towns, it is not diﬃcult for one to be convinced
that a similar tendency appears when one compares levels of taxation and public good provision
across other jurisdictional units such as localities, states, or countries. As another example
that nicely illustrates this point take the recent–and for most policy observers unfavorable for
businesses–change in the corporate income taxation in the UK. Following the announcement
of the new UK corporate tax structure a number of multinationals announced their decision to
relocate to lower-tax regimes. It seems, however, that an exodus of businesses is unlikely to
happen.2 The reason, and arguably a convincing one, for this is that the benefits of relocation
for tax purposes are not evenly spread across once one accounts for requirements of public goods
and market access of diﬀerent types of businesses. To put it diﬀerently: Firms pay attention not
only to tax burdens but also to the benefits that accrue to these firms from market access and
government spending financed by those taxes. It is conceivable, therefore, that as long as there
are benefits from market access and public goods provision an increase in the fiscal burden in a
given jurisdiction may not result in a dramatic decline in the number of firms in that jurisdiction.3
The two previous examples emphasize that, firstly, there is an important interaction between
footloose firms and the number of shoppers/consumers a given jurisdiction is able to attract
and, secondly, that such interaction should impinge upon how jurisdictions behave in a fiscal
competition game not only in relation to the level of taxation but also the level and type of public
goods being provided. It is these issues that this paper is concerned with. More specifically, central
to the analysis of this paper is the idea that jurisdictions may strategically choose to diﬀerentiate
1This view is nicely expressed in ‘Moorestown works to make business boom,’ (December 1, 2006, Moorestown-
NEWSWeekly.com).
2This is a belief held also by policy commentators. See ‘Taxation and the fiscally footllose,’ (May 1, 2008,
Financial Times).
3 Indeed the empirical evidence of the ‘race to the bottom’ in taxation seems to be fairly weak. Stewart and
Webb (2006) provide a short review on this issue and also some additional evidence of weak convergence in the tax
burdens in the OECD countries.
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themselves in the provision of public goods in an eﬀort to attract firms that make use of such
(loosely speaking) firm-specific public goods.4 The consequence of this public good diﬀerentiation,
since firms have a jurisdiction-specific benefit, is that it allows jurisdictions to soften the unfettered
tax competition which has a detrimental impact on revenues. This mechanism has been eloquently
analyzed in the recent contribution by Zissimos and Wooders (2008) who show that jurisdictions,
by diﬀerentiating vertically with respect to public good provision (in the sense that one jurisdiction
provides a high level of public good while the other a low one), can mitigate the downward pressure
of competition on taxes. The analysis of Zissimos and Wooders (2008), though it provides us with
a number of important insights, focuses, however, on the firm side of the economy, abstracting,
in particular, from the consumer side (and so the market access argument emphasized in the two
examples discussed earlier). It is the incorporation of the consumer side (and its interaction with
the firm side) within a model of public good diﬀerentiation and its implications for equilibrium
outcomes that this paper is concerned with. The consideration of such two-sided market (shoppers
and firms) will be shown to have important implications for the level of taxation and the spatial
distribution of firms and consumers across jurisdictions that are absent from a one-sided market.5
One such implication is the possibility of the ‘core-periphery’ outcome that makes appearance
in the new economic geography (NEG) models, where agglomeration of activity emerges in equi-
librium (see, for example, Kind, Knarvik and Schjelderup (2000), and Baldwin and Krugman
(2004)). There is, however, a distinct diﬀerence between the NEG models and the model pre-
sented here: Agglomeration in our model does not arise because of (internal) increasing returns
or suﬃciently high trade costs, but as a consequence of the interaction between mobile firms
and shoppers, level of taxation and public good provision.6 The interaction between shoppers
and firms arises because consumers value variety and, as a consequence, they are more willing
to travel for shopping to a jurisdiction that has attracted many firms. Since firms value market
size they will be, in turn, more inclined to locate in the jurisdiction that has already attracted
many firms. There is, thus, a loop argument between firms and shoppers (shoppers are attracted
4 It has to be noted that this is not, of course, the only dimension over which jurisdictions can diﬀerentiate
themselves. For an alternative view–and one that is based on ‘persuasive advertising’–see the recent contribution
of Konrad (2008).
5Though the tax competition literature is fairly sizeable it has paid no attention to two sided-markets. Wilson
(1999) provides an insightful review on the tax competition literature (see also Wildasin and Wilson (2004)). Two-
sided markets have only been recently the subject of analysis in Public Finance (see Kind, Kothenbuerger and
Schjelderup (2008)). There is a fast-growing literature on two-sided markets with applications that mainly fall into
the Industrial Organization area (see, for example, Caillaud and Julien (2003), Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and
Tirole (2003, 2006)). A working definition of a two-sided market–see, for instance, Rochet and Tirole (2006)–is
that the volume of transactions, in addition to the aggregate price of the ‘platform’, also depends on how the
aggregate price is divided between the two sides. In the present framework, as will be discussed in more details
shortly, the ‘platform’ is the jurisdiction and the two sides that transact in a given jurisdiction are the firms and
the shoppers. The taxes represent prices. It has to be noted, though, that there is a slight deviation between the
two-sided market used in the present paper and that of the working definition: The tax in our model will fall on
the firm side only and not on both sides. However, the main elements of a two-sided market and the existence of
externalities between the two sides make still appearance in the present model.
6Agglomeration forces can arise through other sources, Boadway, Cuﬀ and Marceau (2004). Another feature of
the NEG models is the home market-bias that drives the incentive of firms to locate in the high-demand jurisdiction.
This bias creates location rents and gives rise to the incentive of jurisdictions to set in equilibrium a positive tax
(as in, for instance, Haufler and Wooton (1999)). As will be shown later on, this home-bias makes appearance here,
too, but it does so through a diﬀerent mechanism.
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by firms, firms by shoppers and so on) arising from the fact that once a firm locates in a partic-
ular jurisdiction, it benefits not only itself but also all other firms, through the demand of the
existing consumers that have located (or do their shopping) there. This implies the existence of
a cross-group externality the strength of which depends on how much consumers value variety.
Interestingly, as will be shown in the formal analysis below, the strength of the cross-group
externality will crucially aﬀect market outcomes (tax and public goods). The results show that
there is vertical diﬀerentiation with respect to the public goods provision (Proposition 2). The
degree of vertical diﬀerentiation is aﬀected by the intensity of the interaction between footloose
firms and shoppers. The high public good jurisdiction over-invests, relative to the social optimum,
when the cross-group externality is strong and under-invests when the cross-group externality is
weak. The equilibrium of the fiscal competition game results in asymmetric shares (firm and
shopper/consumer) between the two jurisdictions. Agglomeration (equivalently, and in the form
it will be expressed here, ‘tipping’), where all firm activity is concentrated in one jurisdiction, is
also a distinct possibility.7 For low levels of the cross-group externality the firm side is shared
between the two jurisdictions and an increase in the magnitude of the externality intensifies tax
competition. Despite the decline in tax revenue, as a consequence of the cross-group externality,
it is shown that public good investment can be higher than in a model with no externality
(one-sided model). On the other hand, when the cross-group externality is suﬃciently strong
all firms locate in the high public good jurisdiction, and further increases in the cross-group
externality will lead to a higher tax rate levied by the high public good jurisdiction, ‘race to
the top’ (Proposition 1). The first-best optimal policy always involves all firms locating in the
high public good jurisdiction. The implication of this–and perhaps a surprisingly result–is
that the ineﬃciency of the non-cooperative outcome is mitigated as the cross-group externality
increases and all firms locate in the high public good jurisdiction (Proposition 3). A minimum
tax is eﬀective when the cross-group externality is suﬃciently weak and ineﬀective when the
cross-group externality is suﬃciently strong (Proposition 4).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. Section
3 presents the main analysis. The social planner’s problem is presented in Section 4, whereas
Section 5 evaluates a popular policy proposal: The imposition of a minimum tax across the two
jurisdictions. Section 6 compares the equilibrium outcomes of the present analysis to those of the
one-sided model of Zissimos and Wooders (2008). Finally, Section 7 concludes. All proofs are
relegated in Appendices.
2 The structure of the model
The model is that of Zissimos and Wooders (2008) but it has been appropriately modified to
incorporate the demand side of the economy. It features two jurisdictions A and B, indexed by
k, and two distinct groups of agents: Firms, denoted by f , and shoppers, denoted by s. Each
jurisdiction provides a public good, denoted by xk, and levies taxes to the firms, denoted by τ fk.
7As touched upon previously, albeit briefly, when only the firm side is considered (one-sided model) agglomera-
tion never appears in equilibrium. We come back to this in Section 6.
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Jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction k = A,B is defined as a center of economic activity. They are
both located on the [0, 1] interval, with jurisdiction A being at 0 and B at 1. The cost of the
public good incurred by jurisdiction k is increasing and convex in the level of the public good and
is given by x2k/2.
Firms. Firms are perfectly mobile across jurisdictions and, taking the level of the public good xk
and the tax rate τfk in jurisdiction k = A,B as given, make a decision upon which jurisdiction
to locate. Each firm locates in one jurisdiction. A shopper that travels to jurisdiction k buys one
unit of good from each firm that is located in that jurisdiction. The implication of this, as will
be discussed in more details shortly, is that an additional firm in a given jurisdiction k exerts a
positive externality on all other firms that have located in that jurisdiction.8
Firms are heterogeneous and characterized by a parameter w which is uniformly distributed
on the [0, 1] interval. The mass of firms is one. A firm with parameter w has a (fixed) cost
function F −wxk:9 The component F > 0 is independent of the jurisdiction the firm operates in,
whereas wxk depends on the level of public good xk provided by the jurisdiction k = A,B. The
interpretation of this latter component is that a firm with a higher w receives a higher benefit
from the public good provided by jurisdiction k. Each firm is able to sell each unit of output at,
the exogenously set, price p which without loss of generality is set equal to one.10
In deciding in which jurisdiction to locate, firms care about the number of shoppers in the
jurisdictions, the level of taxes levied, as well as the level of the public good provided by both
jurisdictions. Denoting by nesk the number of shoppers firms expect to make their purchases in
jurisdiction k, the level of profit for firm w who locates in jurisdiction k is given by11
πwk = nesk − (F − wxk)− τfk . (1)
Shoppers. Shoppers, the mass of which is also one, are uniformly distributed on the [0, 1] interval
and they incur a disutility if they do not shop in their ideal location, denoted by z. The (strictly
positive) per-unit travel cost is denoted by t. Shoppers, unlike firms, are assumed to be attached
to a particular jurisdiction, in the sense that each shopper prefers the closer jurisdiction from
his location, all else equal.12 The price shoppers pay, for one unit of a good they purchase, is
the same across both jurisdictions and equal to one. Shoppers value product variety and, thus, a
8This will be, for instance, the case if there is suﬃcient complementarity between the goods being produced.
9One may wonder about the lack, from the specification of the cost function, of a component that captures the
cost of producing the demanded level of output. This omission is, however, without loss of generality as long as
the marginal cost of production is independent of the level of demand.
10This is not an uncommon assumption in the literature. Kanbur and Keen (1993), and Zissimos and Wooders
(2008) also assume that prices are exogenously fixed.
11Notice that by setting p = 1 there is no guarantee that all firms’ profits are nonnegative. This, however, is
not problematic given that p, being exogenous, can be scaled up so to ensure nonnegativity of profits. Equally, the
cost F − wxk, k = A,B, maybe negative if the public good investment is high enough. The model, however, does
not place any constraints on the sign of the fixed cost. It it conceivable, for instance, that the cost is negative and
so jurisdictions subsidize the firms (a possibility that can be excluded by scaling up the fixed cost F ).
12A reasonable justification of this modeling assusmption is that shoppers have already made their decisions
regarding the place of residence somewhere between the two jurisdictions. To do their shopping they then have to
choose which jurisdiction to travel to.
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shopper that has traveled to a given jurisdiction makes a purchase from all firms located in that
jurisdiction.13 The utility gain for a typical shopper of jurisdiction k of an additional firm located
in that jurisdiction is captured parametrically by α ≥ 1. The net utility from each purchase is α−1
(recall that all prices have been set equal to one). The implication of this is that if a jurisdiction
attracts an additional firm this will lead to more shoppers traveling to that jurisdiction, which
in turn will attract even more firms as so on. For wanting a convenient label, α will be called
‘cross-group externality’. It is worth mentioning at this stage, something that we turn to in
Section 6, that in the limiting case in which α = 1 the cross-group externality disappears and the
model reduces to the benchmark one-sided vertical diﬀerentiation model explored by Gabszewicz
and Thisse (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982), and, in a context similar to the present, Zissimos
and Wooders (2008).
Denoting by nefk the number of firms that shoppers expect to locate in jurisdiction k, a shopper
with location characteristic z receives utility
Uz =
(
V + (α− 1)nefA − tz, if she shops in jurisdiction A
V + (α− 1)nefB − t (1− z) , if she shops in jurisdiction B.
(2)
It is assumed that V is suﬃciently high so that all shoppers shop and so the market is covered.
The sequence of events in the game is as follows. In stage 1 jurisdictions choose the level of the
public good. The strategic interaction between the jurisdictions can take a number of forms. In
many contexts it is natural to conceive of a dominant jurisdiction having a first-mover advantage
relative to the other jurisdiction. In others, however, it may be more appealing to conceive
of all jurisdictions moving simultaneously (as in Zissimos and Wooders (2008)). Interestingly,
however, if in the present two-sided-market context both jurisdictions move simultaneously a
pure strategy equilibrium may not exist.14 Existence is restored if jurisdictions move sequentially
in the public goods provision game. This is the case that attention is confined to here.15 In
stage 2, and given the level of the public good xk, jurisdiction k = A,B chooses taxes τ fk (moves
13The reason for such modeling choice is tractability. An alternative modeling assumption might be that each
shopper buys from some firms only but more firms are valued by shoppers. The reason for this is that a larger
pool of firms increases the probability of a better match between firms and consumers. This is the approach
followed, but within a diﬀerent context, by Konishi (2005). In such economic environment an externality of the
type emphasized shortly will still be present thereby preserving the main insights of this paper. The benefit of the
modeling approach taken here is that it is simple enough to yield sharp insights into the issues.
14The proof of this is available upon request. Non-existence is not surprising given, as it will be demonstrated
later on (and in Appendix A.2), the lack of quasi-concavity and a discontinuity of the objective functions. When
the cross-group externality α is low (that is, close to 1), then an equilibrium in the simultaneous move game exists.
So, the model exhibits some continuity with respect to the equilibrium outcomes, since in the one-sided model
(where α = 1) an equilibrium in the simultaneous move game does exist. The non-existence appears for relatively
high values of α. Roger (2007), in a two-sided model where both sides are vertically diﬀerentiated, obtains a similar
non-existence result.
15An alternative to the sequential moves in the public good game is to look for a mixed strategy equilibrium. It
is diﬃcult, however, for one to find convincing arguments in favor of mixed strategies in the context of public good
investments (or investments in general), as these investments take place very infrequently, require long planning
and are primarily irreversible. It seems, thus, more appropriate to assume that jurisdictions move sequentially.
Since the jurisdiction that moves first makes (weakly) higher net revenues than the jurisdiction that follows, both
jurisdictions will prefer to have the first mover advantage. Though this preemption game is not formally modeled,
it is used implicitly as a justification for the approach taken by the present analysis. Tirole (1988, p.297) oﬀers a
discussion on this issue.
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are simultaneous). In stage 3, firms and shoppers, after they observe the strategic choices made
by the jurisdictions, choose in which jurisdiction to locate and in which jurisdiction to make
their purchases, respectively. The solution concept used in the solution of this game is that of a
subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. We turn now to the analysis, starting from the
last stage, of the game.
3 Solving for the subgame perfect equilibrium
3.1 Stage 3: Firms’ and shoppers’ location decision
Suppose, without loss of generality, that xA ≥ xB and thus the diﬀerence in public good provision
between the two jurisdictions, denoted by ∆, is non-negative, that is, ∆ ≡ xA − xB ≥ 0.
Using (1), the marginal firm makes the same profits by locating either in jurisdiction A or juris-
diction B and so
nesA − (F − wxA)− τfA = nesB − (F − wxB)− τfB, (3)
which, upon solving for w, identifies the location of the marginal firm, denoted by wˆ in [0, 1],
given by
wˆ =
(τfA − τfB)− (nesA − nesB)
∆
. (4)
Firms with w ≥ wˆ locate in jurisdiction A and firms with w ≤ wˆ locate in jurisdiction B. A word
of clarification is in order here. It is possible that the public good oﬀered by the two jurisdictions
is homogeneous in the sense that ∆ ≡ xA − xB = 0. Firms, in this case, respond to a Bertrand-
type game by locating in the jurisdiction that oﬀers them the lowest fiscal burden, relative to
the diﬀerence in the size of shoppers in the two jurisdictions.16 Thus, when ∆ = 0, equation (4)
takes the value of17
wˆ =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1, if (τfA − τfB) > (nesA − nesB)
0, if (τfA − τfB) < (nesA − nesB)
0, if (τfA − τfB) = (nesA − nesB).
(5)
The fraction of firms that locates in jurisdiction A and in jurisdiction B are given, respectively,
by
nfA = 1− wˆ and nfB = wˆ. (6)
Consumers can shop in either jurisdiction. Following the utility function in (2), the marginal
shopper derives the same utility by shopping in either jurisdiction A or in jurisdiction B implying
that
V + (α− 1)nefA − tz = V + (α− 1)nefB − t (1− z) . (7)
16 In the one-sided market, in which nesA − nesB = 0, the share of firms in the two jurisdictions is driven by a
comparison between τfA and τfB . In the two-sided market, the share of firms is more complex because of the
interconnection between shoppers, who value variety (and so a large pool of firms in their locality), and firms, who
value a large pool of shoppers (in the place of location).
17When ∆ = 0 and the diﬀerence in taxes is equal to the diﬀerence in the number of shoppers (third case in
condition (5)) there is complete symmetry in the policy instruments. To ensure the existence of an equilibrium in
pure strategies, in this case, it is assumed that all firms locate in jurisdiction A. One could also allow–without
aﬀecting the results in any significant way–for a 50-50 split of the firms between the two jurisdictions. Breaking
the tie in favor of jurisdiction A preserves some continuity, since, as it will be shown later on, when ∆ > 0 but low
jurisdiction A (the high public good jurisdiction) attracts all the firms (and market tips).
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Solving equation (7) for z, the location of the marginal shopper, denoted by zˆ, is given by
zˆ =
(α− 1)
³
nefA − nefB
´
+ t
2t
. (8)
It is, thus, the case that shoppers with z ≥ zˆ locate in jurisdiction B and shoppers with z ≤ zˆ
locate in jurisdiction A. With zˆ ∈ [0, 1], the fraction of shoppers that locates in jurisdiction A
and in jurisdiction B are given, respectively, by
nsA = zˆ and nsB = 1− zˆ. (9)
In equilibrium it must be that expectations are confirmed, that is, nfA = nefA, nfB = n
e
fB,
nsA = nesA and nsB = n
e
sB.
One of the interesting features of the model, as will be shown shortly below, is that the tax-
subgame equilibrium can be an interior, and so both jurisdictions set strictly positive taxes, or a
corner one and so one jurisdiction sets a strictly positive tax whereas the other jurisdiction sets
a zero one. In the latter equilibrium the firm market tips in the sense that all firms locate in the
jurisdiction that sets a strictly positive tax rate.
An interior outcome is determined by the simultaneous solution of the system of equations (6) and
(9). Solving this system one obtains the firm shares in jurisdictions A and B, given, respectively,
by
nfA =
∆t+ t (τfB − τfA)− (α− 1)
∆t− 2 (α− 1) ∈ (0, 1) and nfB =
t (τfA − τ fB)− (α− 1)
∆t− 2 (α− 1) ∈ (0, 1) ,
(10)
and shopper shares given by
nsA =
2 (α− 1) (τfB − τfA − 1) +∆ (−1 + t+ α)
2 [∆t− 2 (α− 1)] ∈ (0, 1) , and (11)
nsB =
2 (α− 1) (τfA − τfB − 1) +∆ (1 + t− α)
2 [∆t− 2 (α− 1)] ∈ (0, 1) .
When tipping occurs the derivation of the limits of these shares will be diﬀerent (and will be
provided in the proofs of the corresponding Propositions).
It is worth noticing, at this stage, that the cross-group externality α and the degree of horizontal
diﬀerentiation (cost of travel) t convey the same meaning, but in inverse relationship. The reason
for this is intuitive: Shoppers, in deciding in which jurisdiction to shop, trade oﬀ the utility
received from variety α and the cost per unit of travel t. More variety implies a high α and so a
higher cost per unit of travel t is required for the marginal shopper zˆ to be indiﬀerent, following
condition (8), between shopping in jurisdiction A or B. For simplicity, in the ensuing analysis all
the results will be cast in terms of the cross-group externality α.
The analysis now turns to the tax competition stage of the game.
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3.2 Stage 2: Competition in taxes
The (gross) revenue function of jurisdiction k = A,B is given by18
Rk(τfA, τfB) = nfkτfk . (12)
Each jurisdiction k = A,B, taking the cost of the public goods in both jurisdictions as given,
chooses own destination-based tax τfk to maximize revenues given by (12) holding Nash con-
jectures against the other jurisdiction. The following Proposition summarizes, for any degree of
vertical diﬀerentiation ∆ ≡ xA − xB ≥ 0, cross-group externality α ≥ 1, and cost per unit of
traveling t > α− 1,19 the Nash equilibrium of the tax competition subgame.
Proposition 1 (Tax competition). The tax subgame equilibrium is characterized by:
i. Firm taxes
τ∗fA =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
2∆
3 −
(α−1)
t if ∆ ≥
3(α−1)
t
α−1
t if ∆ ≤
3(α−1)
t
τ∗fB =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∆
3 −
(α−1)
t if ∆ ≥
3(α−1)
t
0 if ∆ ≤ 3(α−1)t .
(13)
ii. Jurisdiction firm- and shopper-shares
n∗fA =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
2∆t−3(α−1)
3[∆t−2(α−1)] if ∆ ≥
3(α−1)
t
1 if ∆ ≤ 3(α−1)t
n∗fB =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∆t−3(α−1)
3[∆t−2(α−1)] if ∆ ≥
3(α−1)
t
0 if ∆ ≤ 3(α−1)t ,
(14)
n∗sA =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1
2 +
∆(α−1)
6[∆t−2(α−1)] if ∆ ≥
3(α−1)
t
1
2 +
α−1
2t if ∆ ≤
3(α−1)
t
n∗sB =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1
2 −
∆(α−1)
6[∆t−2(α−1)] if ∆ ≥
3(α−1)
t
1
2 −
α−1
2t if ∆ ≤
3(α−1)
t .
(15)
iii. Revenue functions (excluding the cost of the public good)
RA =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
[2∆t−3(α−1)]2
9t[∆t−2(α−1)] if ∆ ≥
3(α−1)
t
α−1
t if ∆ ≤
3(α−1)
t
RB =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
[∆t−3(α−1)]2
9t[∆t−2(α−1)] if ∆ ≥
3(α−1)
t
0 if ∆ ≤ 3(α−1)t .
(16)
Proposition 1 reveals that the tax competition equilibrium is aﬀected by the extent of vertical
diﬀerentiation across the two jurisdictions ∆ ≡ xA − xB measured relative to the threshold
3(α − 1)/t. In particular, if the degree of vertical diﬀerentiation is high, in the sense that ∆ ≥
3(α − 1)/t, then the solution is interior whereas if the degree of vertical diﬀerentiation is low,
in the sense that ∆ ≤ 3(α − 1)/t, the solution is a corner one. Though the precise value of the
threshold is, arguably, model specific it is worth emphasizing that it critically depends upon the
cross-group externality α and the transportation cost t.
It helps the exposition if the circumstances under which these two equilibria arise are discussed.
We turn to this, starting with the interior solution, next.
18For expositional convenience, throughout the paper, the dependence of functions on parameters is suppressed.
19The assumption that t > α− 1 is common in two-sided market models. Armstrong (2006), for example, in a
model where both sides are horizontally diﬀerentiated, introduces this assumption to ensure that both sides of the
market do not tip in favor of one ‘platform’. In the model analyzed here, this assumption prevents the shopper
side from tipping. The results are not expected to change fundamentally if one also allows the shopper side to tip.
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3.2.1 Interior equilibrium of the tax competition subgame (∆ ≥ 3(α− 1)/t)
In an interior equilibrium the high public good jurisdiction, following (13), levies a higher tax,
attracts more firms and more shoppers, following (14) and (15), respectively, and, following (16),
enjoys higher revenues than the low public good jurisdiction.
It helps intuition, at this stage, to consider the comparative statics properties of the tax com-
petition subgame of Proposition 1. Routinely diﬀerentiating (the appropriate parts of) (13) and
(14) one obtains
∂τ∗fA
∂∆
=
2
3
> 0,
∂τ∗fB
∂∆
=
1
3
> 0, (17)
∂τ∗fA
∂α
=
∂τ∗fB
∂α
= −1
t
< 0, (18)
∂n∗fA
∂∆
= − t(α− 1)
3 [∆t− 2 (α− 1)]2
< 0,
∂n∗fB
∂∆
= −
∂n∗fA
∂∆
> 0, (19)
∂n∗fA
∂α
=
∆t
3 [∆t− 2 (α− 1)]2
> 0,
∂n∗fB
∂α
= −
∂n∗fA
∂α
< 0. (20)
That, following (17), an increase in vertical diﬀerentiation makes tax competition less intense
thereby allowing jurisdictions to increase taxes is not new but has previously explored, in this
context, by Zissimos and Wooders (2008). What is new, however, is that: i) following (18), the
equilibrium tax rate of both jurisdictions decreases as the cross-group externality α increases, for
given level of vertical diﬀerentiation ∆ and ii) the tax bases of the two jurisdictions become more
asymmetric as, following (19), the degree of vertical diﬀerentiation ∆ decreases, and, following
(20), the cross-group externality increases.
It is, thus, the case that tax competition becomesmore intense with an increase in the cross-group
externality. The intuition for this is the following. One can straightforwardly verify that taxes are
strategic complements (and so both best response functions are upward sloping).20 As the level
of the cross-group externality α increases, for given tax rates, two eﬀects occur. Firstly, following
(10), the tax base of the high public good jurisdiction A increases while that of B decreases.
This makes tax cuts more costly for the high public good jurisdiction, because its tax base has
increased, and less costly for the low public good jurisdiction. Secondly, following again from (10),
as the cross-group externality α increases a tax cut attracts more marginal firms. Both eﬀects
make tax cuts more profitable for the low public good jurisdiction as the cross-group externality
increases, but they are opposing for the high public good jurisdiction. It turns out that the
second eﬀect is stronger and the high public good jurisdiction also becomes more aggressive in
setting its taxes as the externality intensifies. Hence, with a higher cross-group externality α,
each jurisdiction’s best response function shifts so that it sets a lower tax for any tax levied by
the rival. This in turn implies lower equilibrium taxes.21
20This can be straightforwardly seen from the first order conditions given in Appendix A.1.
21The intuition behind an increase in the cost of traveling t follows similar reasoning and it is, therefore, omitted.
Also the intuition behind (19) and (20) is provided shortly below.
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3.2.2 Tipping equilibrium of the tax competition subgame (∆ ≤ 3(α− 1)/t)
Proposition 1 also emphasizes the possibility of a tipping equilibrium that arises if the degree
of vertical diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently low, in the sense that ∆ ≤ 3(α − 1)/t. To see why
this happens notice that, following (4), in every location decision a firm makes it evaluates the
diﬀerence in the i) number of shoppers nesA − nesB, ii) tax burden τfA − τfB, and iii) public
good provision ∆ ≡ xA − xB that prevail in the two jurisdictions. Suppose now that the degree
of vertical diﬀerentiation ∆ decreases by one unit (keeping α and t fixed). The consequence of
such a reduction is that the equilibrium tax diﬀerential between the two jurisdictions, given by
τ∗fA− τ∗fB = ∆/3, falls by a fraction of one unit that is, ∂(τ∗fA− τ∗fB)/∂∆ = 1/3.22 This implies
that, for given diﬀerence in the allocation of shoppers nesA−nesB > 0, the location of the marginal
firm changes, following (4), by
∂wˆ
∂∆
=
nesA − nesB
∆2
> 0, (21)
and so more firms locate in jurisdiction A. This is not, however, the end of the story, since, with
now more firms locating in jurisdiction A, there are more shoppers willing to locate there thereby
moving the location of the marginal firm closer to 0. This process continues until the market tips
in favor of jurisdiction A, as ∆ decreases further. Not all shoppers, however, would locate into
this jurisdiction. The reason for this is that for some consumers of jurisdiction B, jurisdiction A
is ‘very far away’ and so locating there is costly relative to the benefit they would derive from
the existence of more varieties there. Since jurisdiction B has no tax base, it also sets a zero tax
rate. Jurisdiction A, on the other hand, having the market tipped in its favor, can aﬀord to set
a strictly positive tax.
Tipping in the firm market is also likely to occur with an increase in the cross-group externality
α. The reason for the dependence of tipping on this measure is intuitive. A high cross-group
externality α means that shoppers care more about the number of firms in a given jurisdiction.
This implies that the high public good jurisdiction, which has already attracted more firms, is
now able to attract more consumers. A consequence of this is that more firms will be attracted
to this jurisdiction which will attract even more consumers and so on. If the market has tipped,
a further increase in the cross-group externality α will allow jurisdiction A to further increase its
tax.23
The discussion in the last two subsections shows that, overall, the eﬀect of the cross-group ex-
ternality α on the tax of the high public good jurisdiction is non-monotonic (and in particular
U -shaped): Decreasing when the firm side is shared (in which case α is low) and increasing when
tipping has occurred (in which case α is high). The same eﬀect is monotonic for the low public
good jurisdiction (decreasing).
22This is a consequence of the fact that the high public good jurisdiction A responds by reducing its tax by more
than jurisdiction B.
23This interpretation is reminiscent to the idea, that makes appearance in the NEG models, that a ‘race to the
top’ arises because of the existence of location rents for firms. It is because of these rents that jurisdictions are
capable of increasing taxes and firms accepting them. For a recent contribution, see Baldwin and Krugman (2004).
See also footnote 6.
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We turn now to the first stage of the game in which jurisdictions compete in the provision of the
public goods.
3.3 Stage 1: Competition in public goods provision
The government of jurisdiction k = A,B maximizes net revenues. Assume now that, without
loss of generality, jurisdiction A moves first in the choice of public good provision whereas B
moves second. Combining (16) with the cost of the public good, and allowing for the degree
of vertical diﬀerentiation ∆ to be positive or negative, one obtains the net revenue function of
jurisdiction A. Depending on the level of public goods the two jurisdictions provide, and whether
the firm market is shared or not between them, there are four possible configurations (and thus
four regions in the net revenue function of a jurisdiction). These configurations imply that the
net revenue function of jurisdiction A is given by
RA (xA, xB) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
[−∆t−3(α−1)]2
9t[−∆t−2(α−1)] −
x2A
2 if ∆ ≤ −
3(α−1)
t (Region 1)
−x
2
A
2 if −
3(α−1)
t ≤ ∆ < 0 (Region 2)
α−1
t −
x2A
2 if 0 ≤ ∆ ≤
3(α−1)
t (Region 3)
[2∆t−3(α−1)]2
9t[∆t−2(α−1)] −
x2A
2 if ∆ ≥
3(α−1)
t (Region 4),
(22)
and depicted in Figure 1. In this figure, region 1 depicts the case in which jurisdiction A is the
low public good jurisdiction and the firm market is shared. In region 2 jurisdiction A is the low
public good jurisdiction and the firm market is tipped in favor of jurisdiction B. Region 3 depicts
the case in which jurisdiction A is the high public good jurisdiction and the market is tipped in
its favor, whereas region 4 illustrates the case in which jurisdiction A is the high public good
jurisdiction and the market is shared.
The problem of jurisdiction A is then to maximize its net revenue, given by (22), by the appro-
priate choice of xA, anticipating the response of jurisdiction B.24 Such maximization problem is
not trivial. The reason for this is the existence of the cross-group externality which gives rise to
i) a discontinuity, and ii) diﬀerent shapes of (a part of) the revenue function.
To facilitate the understanding of the characterization of the public goods equilibrium, a short
discussion on the properties of the net revenue function of jurisdiction A, and, in particular, its
dependence on the cross-group externality α, will prove helpful. We do so with the help of Figure
1. As depicted in Figure 1, the net revenue function is decreasing in regions 1-3, irrespective of the
size of the cross-group externality α, except at the point where there is no vertical diﬀerentiation
and, thus, ∆ = 0. At that point, the net revenue function is discontinuous. Region 4, however,
does depend on the cross-group externality α, giving rise to a range of shapes (in order not to
over burden the figure, Figure 1 depicts only one possible shape, the inverse U -shaped).
The magnitude of the cross-group externality α shapes the incentives of jurisdiction A, the leader,
to invest in public good in the following way. When the cross-group externality α is suﬃciently
24Jurisdiction B has a net revenue function of the same structure as that of jurisdiction A, obtained by a simple
relabeling of the variables in (22). The full details of the characterization of a jurisdiction’s net revenue function
can be found in Appendices A.2 and A.3.
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Figure 1: Net revenue function of jurisdiction A
low (that is, close to one), then the maximum of the net revenue function occurs in region 4.
Jurisdiction A, then, will choose public good provision that corresponds to the point where the
maximum is attained, denoted by x˜A in Figure 1. At this level of public good, jurisdiction B
will have no incentive to leapfrog jurisdiction A.25 As the cross-group externality α increases, the
maximum in region 4 decreases (the net revenue may become everywhere decreasing in region 4).
Because of the discontinuity of the net revenue function, leapfrogging by jurisdiction B becomes
a profitable possibility (jurisdiction B can marginally choose xB = xA+ε at ∆ = 0), an incentive
that becomes more pronounced as the cross-group externality increases. The leader, then, and in
order to prevent jurisdiction B from becoming the high public good jurisdiction, will choose a high
level of the public good. Intuition suggests, then, that, in this case, the response of jurisdiction
B will be to choose a suﬃciently low level (zero) of the public good.
We now turn to the formal characterization of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Public goods investments). The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is described
as follows:26
25Not surprisingly, this is also the case in a one-sided market, where α = 1.
26The precise parameter thresholds are given in the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A.4. Notice also that
the closed form solutions to case 2iii, being tediously long, are not presented in the Proposition.
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i. High cross-group externality: Jurisdiction A (the first-mover) chooses
x∗A =
p
2 (α− 1)√
t
,
where x∗A < 3 (α− 1) /t and jurisdiction B (the follower) chooses x∗B = 0. Because ∆ <
3 (α− 1) /t, the firm side tips in favor of jurisdiction A. Both jurisdictions earn zero net revenue.
As the cross-group externality decreases, jurisdiction A lowers its public good investment.
ii. Medium cross-group externality: Jurisdiction A (the first-mover) chooses
x∗A ∈
Ã
3 (α− 1)
t
,
p
2 (α− 1)√
t
!
,
and jurisdiction B chooses x∗B = 0. Because ∆ > 3 (α− 1) /t, the firm side is shared between
the two jurisdictions (no tipping). Both jurisdictions earn strictly positive net revenue, with
jurisdiction A’s net revenue being higher than B’s. As the cross-group externality decreases, the
leader lowers its public good investment.
iii. Low cross-group externality: Jurisdiction A (the first-mover) chooses x∗A = max {x˜A, x¯}
where x˜A ∈ [3 (α− 1) /t,∞) satisfies
∂RA(x˜A, 0)
∂xA
=
[2tx˜A − 3 (α− 1)] [2tx˜A − 5 (α− 1)]
9 [tx˜A − 2 (α− 1)]2
− x˜A = 0,
and x¯ ∈
³
3 (α− 1) /t,
p
2 (α− 1)/
√
t
´
. The follower chooses x∗B = 0. Because ∆ > 3 (α− 1) /t,
the firm side is shared between the two jurisdictions (no tipping). Both jurisdictions earn strictly
positive net revenue, with jurisdiction A’s net revenue being higher than B’s.
Proposition 2 shows that in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, irrespective of the significance
of the cross-group externality, the follower always chooses zero public good provision. This
results in a high degree of vertical diﬀerentiation. Jurisdiction A, having a first mover advantage,
surprisingly, does not have any strict net revenue advantage over the follower, when the externality
is suﬃciently high. Both jurisdictions, in this case, earn zero (net) revenues.27 The reason for
this is the following. Given that the externality is high the equilibrium involves tipping. This
implies that the jurisdiction with low public good (jurisdiction B), having no tax base, must earn
zero net revenue. This, in turn, implies that the high public good jurisdiction, too, earns zero net
revenue. The reason for this is that if jurisdiction A enjoyed strictly positive revenue then the
follower would have a profitable deviation by marginally leapfrogging the leader, inducing market
tipping in its favor and earning strictly positive net revenue.
The first mover (jurisdiction A) chooses its public good investment to ensure that it will not be
leapfrogged by the follower and, given that this does not happen, it maximizes its own net revenue
function. When the externality is high and medium the first consideration is binding. Jurisdiction
A provides high levels of the public good in order to prevent the follower from becoming the high
public good jurisdiction. When the externality is low, either consideration may bind (depending
27 It can also be straightforwardly verified that the endogenously chosen degree of vertical diﬀerentiation is non-
monotonic (U-shaped) in the cross-group externality α.
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on the strength of the externality). In this case, Proposition 2 shows that there is an x˜A that
maximizes the net revenue function (given that xB = 0) and an x¯ that prevents leapfrogging.28
Having described the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game, naturally, one might wonder
how (in)eﬃcient the equilibrium in the public good stage of the game is. To facilitate such
comparison one needs to solve for the social planner’s problem and compare the solution with the
non-cooperative outcome of Proposition 2. We turn to this next.
4 Welfare analysis (first-best)
A social planner maximizes social surplus (denoted by ω and defined to be equal to the sum of
aggregate profits and aggregate utility) given by
ω(xA, xB, z, w) =Z z
0
[V + (α− 1) (1− w)− tc] dc+
Z 1
z
[V + (α− 1)w − t (1− c)] dc
+
Z w
0
[(1− z)− (F − cxB)] dc−
x2B
2
+
Z 1
w
[z − (F − cxA)] dc−
x2A
2
, (23)
by choosing public goods investments xA and xB, the location of the marginal shopper z, and
the location of the marginal firm w.29 It is easy to verify that (23) reduces to
ω(xA, xB, z, w) = V − F +
xA
¡
1− w2
¢
2
+
xBw2
2
+ αw (1− z) + αz (1− w)
−
µ
t
2
+ tz2 − tz
¶
−
µ
x2A
2
+
x2B
2
¶
, (24)
and so it is the components of (24) that the social planner seeks to maximize. Leaving aside the
term V −F which is fixed, the terms xA
¡
1− w2
¢
/2+xBw2/2 give the total cost reduction for the
firms in both jurisdictions. Such terms are maximized at an asymmetric solution, where only one
jurisdiction invests and attracts all the firms, due to the complementarity between public good
investment and the number of firms in a given jurisdiction. The terms in αw (1− z)+αz (1− w)
give the total cross-group externality which is maximized at an asymmetric solution where one
jurisdiction attracts all firms and shoppers and, thus, requires either w = 0 and z = 1, or w = 1
and z = 0. This is due to the complementarity between the number of firms and shoppers in
a given jurisdiction. The terms t/2 + tz2 − tz give the total travel cost which, as it is usual in
Hotelling-type models, is minimized at a symmetric solution, that is when z = 1/2. Finally, the
terms in x2A/2 + x
2
B/2 give the the cost of the public goods, minimized at a symmetric solution.
This is because the cost functions are convex and the social planner would like to spread the
investment cost across the two jurisdictions (as long as a jurisdiction has attracted some firms).
The first-best solution will balance optimally the above trade-oﬀs.
28 It is worth noting that as the cross group externality approaches 1, the optimal choice of jurisdiction A converges
to 4/9, which is the public good investment in the one-sided model (see also Section 6).
29Notice that taxes do not enter the specification in (23) since they are simply transfers from firms to jurisdictions.
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The first order conditions of (24) with respect to xA, xB, z and w give
∂ω
∂xA
=
1−w2
2
− xA, (25)
∂ω
∂xB
=
w2
2
− xB, (26)
∂ω
∂z
= α (1− 2w) + t− 2tz, (27)
∂ω
∂w
= α (1− 2z)− w (xA − xB) . (28)
If an interior maximum exists then it will satisfy (25)-(28) with equality. It can be shown that such
solution does not exist.30 Denoting optimality by sp, the optimal solution is given by xspA = 1/2,
xspB = 0, w
sp = 0 and zsp = 1/2 + α/(2t).
It is thus the case that, since wsp = 0, the social planner always wants the firm side to be tipped
in favor of the high public good jurisdiction. Summarizing:
Proposition 3 (Eﬃciency). The social planner’s solution is described as follows:
i. Jurisdiction A is the high public good jurisdiction, with xspA = 1/2, and jurisdiction B
makes the minimum public good investment that is, xspB = 0.
ii. All firms are located in the high public good jurisdiction, jurisdiction A, that is, nspfA = 1.
iii. Jurisdiction A (the high public good jurisdiction) attracts more shoppers (zsp = 1/2 +
α/(2t)) than jurisdiction B, the low public good jurisdiction.
A simple comparison of Propositions 2 and 3 reveals that the low public good jurisdiction always
chooses the first-best level of public good investment. The eﬃcient level of firm location (tipping)
is achieved, too, when the cross-group externality is suﬃciently high (Proposition 2i). Even in this
case, however, the high public good jurisdiction over-invests as x∗A =
p
2 (α− 1)/
√
t > xspA = 1/2.
If the cross-group externality is medium or low (in the sense of Proposition 2ii and iii) then the
market is shared, and the low public good jurisdiction attracts some firms. In this case, the high
public good jurisdiction selects a level of investment that is above the first-best level when the
externality is medium (in the sense that x∗A > x
sp
A = 1/2), and under-invests (in the sense that
x∗A < x
sp
A = 1/2) when the externality is low. To emphasize:
Corollary 1 At the non-cooperative equilibrium, the low public good jurisdiction (jurisdiction B)
makes the eﬃcient level of investment. The level of the high public good jurisdiction (jurisdiction
A) is ineﬃcient. Depending on the level of the cross-group externality, this investment can be
above or below the eﬃcient level.
30Solving (25)-(27) and substituting into (28) yields a third degree polynomial in w, given by ∂ω/∂w = [2tw3 −
t− 4α2

w− 2α2]/(2t) = 0. To solve for the w we calculate the slope of w at the two boundaries. It can be easily
shown that ∂ω(w = 0)/∂w = −2α2/(2t) < 0 and ∂ω(w = 1)/∂w = (t + 2α2)/(2t) > 0. Because the first order
condition is strictly negative at w = 0 the first intersection with the zero axis would correspond to a local minimum
(there will be at least one intersection since the first order condition at w = 1 is positive). Using the Descartes’ rule
of signs it can be shown that the polynomial has only one real positive root (because it changes sign only once).
Thus, this root must correspond to an interior local minimum. Based on these arguments, an interior solution does
not exist.
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Proposition 2i has also shown that a strong cross-group externality makes the firm market tip in
favor of the high public good jurisdiction. It is so the case that:
Corollary 2 When the cross-group externality is suﬃciently high (as in Proposition 2i) the firm
market tips and the non-cooperative outcome is the eﬃcient one, in terms of the allocation of
firms.
The social planner prefers more shoppers in the high public good jurisdiction than the number of
shoppers that prevails in the non-cooperative equilibrium. First, assume that the non-cooperative
outcome exhibits tipping. Now compare zsp of Proposition 3iii with zˆ = 1/2 + (α− 1) /(2t) <
zsp.31 Second, when there is no tipping zˆ is even lower. Shoppers, when they choose where to
go, do not internalize the positive externality their action has on the firms and as a result fewer
shoppers (than the first-best number) decide to shop in jurisdiction A. The reason for this is that
shoppers care only about the part of the externality that they receive, which is α− 1, as opposed
to the whole externality α. This externality is, however, internalized by the social planner who
may also prefer the shopper side to tip in favor of A (if t < α).
The preceding discussion has pointed out that the non-cooperative outcome may be ineﬃcient.
The issue that arises, then, is whether tax coordination policies can improve upon this ineﬃciency.
In the next section we look at a policy coordination proposal: A minimum tax.32
5 Tax policy coordination: A minimum tax
Suppose now that the two jurisdictions–for levels of the public goods investments given in Propo-
sition 2–negotiate in order to reach an agreement on a minimum tax. For a minimum tax to
influence policy, and so to be binding, it must be that it is strictly higher than the equilibrium
tax of jurisdiction B (as it is given in Proposition 1). For an agreement to be feasible the mini-
mum tax, denoted by μ, must be i) constraint Pareto eﬃcient, in the sense that no jurisdiction
k = A,B can increase its tax revenues by deviating from this minimum tax without reducing
the tax revenues of the other jurisdiction33 and ii) individually rational in the sense that both
jurisdictions earn strictly higher revenues than before the imposition of the minimum tax (strict
individual rationality). We thus search, starting from the tax rates of Proposition 1, for the set of
all feasible minimum taxes. To this end, let M = {μ ∈ R+: conditions i) and ii) are satisfied}.
There are two cases to consider: The case in which the market is shared and the case in which
the market is tipped.
Recall that in the case in which the market is shared (which occurs if ∆ > 3(α − 1)/t), the
equilibrium taxes, following Proposition 1, are given by τ∗fA = 2∆/3 − (α − 1)/t and τ∗fB =
31 zˆ follows from (8) after setting nefA − nefB = 1.
32An earlier version of this paper also considered the tax policy harmonization considered by Zissimos and
Wooders (2008). Under this policy proposal the two jurisdictions attempt to reach an agreement on bringing their
taxes closer together in the sense that the high public good jurisdiction will lower its tax by μA, while the low
public good jurisdiction will raise its tax by μB, relative to the equilibrium taxes of Proposition 1. This policy
proposal, not surprisingly, cannot make both jurisdiction better oﬀ.
33This implies that that a minimum tax agreement is on the constrained Pareto frontier. It is constrained because
after the imposition of the minimum tax the jurisdictions act non-cooperatively.
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∆/3− (α− 1)/t. Since τ∗fA > τ∗fB, the minimum tax, denoted by τmink , should bind jurisdiction
k = B and should take the form
τminB = τ
∗
fB + μ =
∆
3
− (α− 1)
t
+ μ. (29)
Given τminB , jurisdiction A’s best response is to set
34
τminA =
2∆
3
− (α− 1)
t
+
μ
2
. (30)
Given the taxes defined in (29) and (30), the revenue functions of the two jurisdictions A and
B–making use of (10) into (12)–are given, respectively, by
RA (μ) =
[4∆t− 6 (α− 1) + 3μt]2
36t [∆t− 2 (α− 1)] , (31)
RB (μ) =
[∆t− 3 (α− 1) + 3μt] [2∆t− 6 (α− 1)− 3μt]
18t [∆t− 2 (α− 1)] . (32)
It can be verified that the revenue function of jurisdiction A in (31) is increasing in μ, whereas
the revenue function of jurisdiction B in (32) is concave in μ and attains a maximum at
μ∗ =
∆
6
− α− 1
2t
. (33)
It is intuitive that any minimum tax that is Pareto constrained cannot be less than the μ∗ defined
by (33). For if it is, following the argument regarding the shape of the revenue functions of the
two jurisdictions, both jurisdictions can increase their revenues. It follows, then, that if a set of
minimum taxes M exists then it must contain minimum taxes with the property that μ > μ∗. To
state this diﬀerently: Any agreed upon minimum tax must involve μ > μ∗, as is defined by (33),
as this ensures that a minimum tax agreement is on the constrained Pareto frontier.
The minimum tax agreement must also be individually rational for both jurisdictions. For juris-
diction A things are simple: As its revenues are increasing in μ > 0, it is individually rational to
accept any minimum tax. This is not, however, true–given the concavity of the revenue function
under a minimum tax–for jurisdiction B. Individual rationality for this jurisdiction dictates
that the minimum tax agreeable should not yield lower revenues than in the no minimum tax
equilibrium of Proposition 1. A simple comparison of the revenue function of jurisdiction B under
no minimum tax, given by Proposition 1, and the revenue function in (32) reveals that this is the
case if and only if
μ <
∆
3
− α− 1
t
. (34)
From (33) and (34) it, then, follows that any
μ ∈
µ
∆
6
− α− 1
2t
,
∆
3
− α− 1
t
¶
, (35)
is (strictly) individually rational and lies on the constrained Pareto frontier.
34This follows from the first order condition of jurisdiction A, given in Appendix A1.
18
It is, thus, the case that coordination, in the form of a minimum tax, is beneficial for the gov-
ernments of the jurisdiction. This is an implication of the fact that minimum tax coordination
improves eﬃciency in the sense that more firms now locate in the high public good jurisdiction
A, relative to the no minimum tax case, thereby resulting in a more asymmetric outcome in
terms of firm shares across the two jurisdictions.35 This, as emphasized in Proposition 3, im-
proves eﬃciency as the social planner’s solution involves tipping in favor of the high public good
jurisdiction.36
Interestingly, as the cross-group externality increases, a minimum tax agreement is less likely to
exist. The reason for this is that–as demonstrated in the previous section–as α increases the
non-cooperative equilibrium, holding the levels of the public goods fixed, becomes more eﬃcient.
The implication of this is that there is less room for a Pareto improvement. This is being shown
formally next.
Suppose that the firm side has tipped that is, ∆ ≤ 3 (α− 1) /t. In this case the equilibrium taxes,
following Proposition 1, are given by, τ∗fA = (α− 1) /t and τ∗fB = 0. The minimum tax, in this
case, is
τminB = τ
∗
fB + μ = μ . (36)
Given τminB , jurisdiction A’s best response is to set
τminA =
(α− 1)
t
+ μ . (37)
In this case, the high public good jurisdiction responds by increasing its tax by the same amount
the low public good jurisdiction increased its tax. There will be no eﬀect on the firm shares and
the revenue of the low public good jurisdiction will not increase as a result of a minimum tax
imposition. Therefore, there does not exist a (strictly) individually rational agreement that is
diﬀerent from the equilibrium under no minimum tax.
Summarizing the preceding discussion:
Proposition 4 (Minimum tax). Fix ∆ ≡ xA − xB as it is given in Proposition 2.
i. Firm side is shared and so ∆ > 3 (α− 1) /t. Any minimum tax μ > 0 in the set
M = (∆/6− (α− 1)/(2t),∆/3− (α− 1)/t) is strictly individually rational for both jurisdictions
and lies on the constrained Pareto frontier.
ii. Firm side has tipped and so ∆ ≤ 3 (α− 1) /t. There does not exist a minimum tax
that makes both jurisdictions strictly better oﬀ and lies on the constrained Pareto frontier, that is
M = ∅.
A recurring feature of the analysis is the importance of the cross-group externality. One, then,
might wonder how the equilibrium of the fiscal competition game in a two-sided market compares
to equilibrium in the one-sided market. We turn to this next.
35To see this first notice that, following (29) and (30), minimum tax coordination, for given vertical diﬀerentiation
∆ > 0, implies

τminA − τminB

= ∆/3 − μ/2 and so a reduction in the tax diﬀerential relative to the no minimum
tax coordination case. Following (10), then more firms locate in the high public good jurisdiction A.
36This is in the spirit of Kanbur and Keen (1993), and Zissimos and Wooders (2008).
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6 Two-sided versus one-sided market
Notice that if the cross-group externality is equal to one then Proposition 1 reduces to the
equilibrium of the one-sided market analyzed by Zissimos and Wooders (2008). In this case the
outcome is always in the interior and the equilibrium taxes are given by
τ∗fA (xA, xB, α = 1) =
2∆
3
and τ∗fB (xA, xB, α = 1) =
∆
3
. (38)
In the non-cooperative equilibrium analyzed by Zissimos and Wooders (2008) the equilibrium
levels of the public good are given by37
x∗A =
4
9
and x∗B = 0, (39)
whereas the market shares are given by
n∗fA =
2
3
and n∗fB =
1
3
. (40)
In such a one-sided market, eﬃciency, denoted by s, dictates that
xsA =
1
2
and xsB = 0, (41)
and
nsfA = 1 and n
s
fB = 0. (42)
Eﬃciency. It is, thus, the case that in a one-sided model, the high public good jurisdiction
always under-invests relative to the social optimum since, following from (39) and (41), x∗A =
4/9 < xsA = 1/2. In a two-sided model over-investment is also possible (Corollary 1). It is also
the case that in a one-sided market, following (40) and (42), there is always a divergence between
the social optimum and the non-cooperative outcome in terms of firm shares. The (one-sided
market) first-best always entails one jurisdiction (the high public good one) attracting all firms,
while in the non-cooperative solution both jurisdictions have strictly positive firm shares. In
contrast, in a two-sided market, when the externality is strong, the social optimum coincides
with the non-cooperative outcome, in the sense that all firms are located in the high public good
jurisdiction (Corollary 2).
Firm shares/agglomeration. The one-sided model, following (40), always yields an interior
equilibrium with both jurisdictions attracting firms. The analysis developed here is flexible enough
to generate, depending on the strength of the cross-group externality, an interior as well as,
following Proposition 1, the ‘core-periphery’ equilibrium outcome in which the firm market tips
in favor of the high public good jurisdiction.
Public good provision. Strong and medium cross-group externality (Proposition 2i and ii)
lead to a higher public good provision, on part of the high public good jurisdiction, in the two-
sided model than in the one-sided, that is, x∗A > 4/9. Despite the fact that the presence of
37Note that even if jurisdictions move sequentially when they choose public goods investments, in the one-sided
model, the equilibrium does not change. So, the diﬀerence in the results with our model is not attributed to the
assumption about the timing of the moves in the public goods game. The proof of this is available upon request.
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the cross-group externality intensifies tax competition, when the firm side is shared (medium
externality), and hence tax revenues decline, public goods investment is higher than when the
externalities are ignored. When the externality is low, public good provision in the two-sided
market x∗A can be less or greater than 4/9. Perhaps not surprisingly, it can be be shown that as
α → 1 (or t → ∞), the level of public good provision (of Proposition 2iii) x∗A converges to 4/9,
the outcome of the one-sided market.38
Taxes. When tipping occurs, equilibrium taxes are more asymmetric across the two jurisdictions
than in a one-sided model. The high public good jurisdiction levies a higher tax (when the cross-
group externality α is high and the firm side tips) than the one-sided tax, τ∗fA = (α − 1)/t >
2∆/3 = 8/27 (since ∆ = x∗A − x∗B = 4/9). The low public good jurisdiction levies a lower tax
than the one-sided tax, τ∗fB = 0 < ∆/3 = 4/27. When the firm side is shared, equilibrium taxes
for both jurisdictions are lower than in the benchmark one-sided model.
Minimum tax. Finally, a minimum tax is always eﬀective in a one-sided model, whereas in a
two-sided model this is the case only when the externality is weak. A strong externality renders
such a policy proposal ineﬀective.
7 Concluding remarks
A neglected issue in the tax competition literature is the dependence of equilibrium outcomes on
the presence of firms and shoppers (two-sided markets). Making use of a model of vertical and
horizontal diﬀerentiation within which jurisdictions compete, by providing public goods and levy-
ing taxes to attract firms and shoppers, the paper has explored such dependence. An attractive
feature of the model is that it is flexible enough to yield firm and shopper shares that are very
asymmetric across jurisdictions, depending on the degree of the interaction in the two markets.
This allows us to obtain agglomeration of firm activity in one jurisdiction, which also appears in
the new economic geography (NEG) models.
The interaction of the two-sides in the tax competition game has been shown to give rise to
a cross-group externality, which has profound implications for the equilibrium outcomes. For
instance, as shown in Proposition 1, this cross-group externality intensifies the asymmetry of
the shares (firm and shopper/consumer) between the jurisdictions (an observation that is absent
in the one-sided model). Within such framework, it has been shown that jurisdictions choose
diﬀerent public goods investments (vertical diﬀerentiation). The low public good jurisdiction
chooses the minimum possible level (zero) and the high public good jurisdiction chooses a strictly
positive investment. The degree of vertical diﬀerentiation, relative to that in the one-sided model,
is: i) higher if the cross-group externality is strong and ii) lower if the externality is weak
(Proposition 2). For low levels of the cross-group externality the firm side is shared between the
two jurisdictions and an increase in the magnitude of the externality intensifies tax competition.
On the other hand, when the externality is strong the firm side tips in favor of the high public
38The proof of the comparison of the public good investment between one-sided and two-sided markets can be
found in the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A.4.
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good jurisdiction, and further externality increases will lead to a higher tax rate levied by the high
public good jurisdiction (Proposition 1). The high public good jurisdiction over-invests, relative
to the social optimum, when the externality is strong and under-invests when the externality is
weak. The first-best outcome always involves firm tipping. In that sense, the ineﬃciency of the
non-cooperative outcome is mitigated as the cross-group externality increases and the firm side
tips (Proposition 3). A minimum tax is eﬀective when the externality is weak and ineﬀective
when the externality is strong (Proposition 4).
The results of the model also cast some light on the empirical determinants of the incentives of
multinationals to locate in a given jurisdiction. There is considerable evidence which, generally,
confirms that corporate taxation has a significantly negative eﬀect on the investment decision
of multinational firms. The magnitude of such eﬀect, however, seems to depend, crucially, upon
the specific aspects of the investment being undertaken by the multinationals as well as upon
sector-specific characteristics of the firms that locate their businesses.39 What the model and the
analysis suggest here is that to proper assess the eﬀect of taxation on the investment decision
of multinationals, one requires in the empirical estimation not only the level of taxation as an
explanatory variable but, as noted in the introductory section, also firm-specific public goods and
market access.
The limitations of this paper suggest avenues for future research. One avenue that is, arguably,
worth exploring is the dependence of the equilibrium outcomes upon endogenously determined
prices. Following the work of Trandel (1994), the introduction of an additional stage for the
determination of prices is not expected to change qualitatively the results if the equilibrium is in
the interior. What is diﬃcult to conjecture, however, is the extent to which such economy can
support an equilibrium with tipping in the firm market. The reason for this is that if all firms
locate in a high public good jurisdiction the marginal firm might want to re-locate to the low
public good jurisdiction and charge a higher price to the remaining shoppers. This response by
the marginal firm indicates the possibility that a tipping equilibrium may be ‘more diﬃcult’ to
emerge.
Firms have also been assumed to be footloose. It would be interesting to investigate the role of
the cross-group externality on public goods investments and tax competition when firms have a
certain degree of attachment to a particular jurisdiction.
Public goods in the model benefit only the firms. In reality, however, public goods also confer
utility to consumers. A fruitful extension to the model analyzed here might, therefore, be a
situation where the public goods investments benefit both sides of the market and not only firms.
Investments in infrastructure is an example that fits well here. An interesting case to explore
in such an environment, is the extent to which the principle of maximum diﬀerentiation holds.
Intuition, however, suggests that it might not since, in this case, the utility derived from the
public good provision might mitigate any strategic incentives arising from vertical diﬀerentiation.
39And, of course, on the tax measures being used. On this see, for instance, Desai and Hines (2004). See also
Herger, Kotsogiannis and McCorriston (2008).
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There remains much scope for the analysis of tax competition in richer models of two-sided
markets. We hope to have shown that the task is worthwhile and that the conclusions can be
instructive.
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Appendices
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The first order conditions of the revenue functions for jurisdiction A and B with respect to taxes
are given, respectively, by
∂RA
∂τfA
=
∆t− (α− 1) + tτfB − 2tτfA
∆t− 2 (α− 1) = 0 and
∂RB
∂τfB
=
− (α− 1) + tτfA − 2tτfB
∆t− 2 (α− 1) = 0. (A.1.1)
Suﬃciency requires that ∂2Rk/∂τ2fk = −(2t)/[∆t− 2 (α− 1)] < 0, k = A,B, which is satisfied if
and only if
∆ >
2 (α− 1)
t
. (A.1.2)
The proof now explores the dependency of optimality on the values of ∆. There are two cases to
consider.
Interior equilibrium. In such an equilibrium no jurisdiction has an incentive to unilaterally
deviate from the solution to the system of the first order conditions in (A.1.1) given by τfA =
2∆/3−(α− 1) /t and τfB = ∆/3−(α− 1) /t. The proof now verifies that there exists an interval
∆ ≥ 3(α− 1)/t such that wˆ, zˆ ∈ [0, 1].
Making use of the fact that τfA − τfB = ∆/3 into (10) and (11) and these into (4) and (8) one
obtains, in an interior equilibrium, that
wˆ =
∆t− 3 (α− 1)
3 [∆t− 2 (α− 1)] and zˆ =
1
2
+
∆ (α− 1)
6 [∆t− 2 (α− 1)] . (A.1.3)
The denominators of both wˆ and zˆ in (A.1.3) are strictly positive if and only if ∆ > 2 (α− 1) /t,
a condition that is satisfied from the second order condition in (A.1.2). Moreover, wˆ ≥ 0 if
and only if ∆ ≥ 3 (α− 1) /t, wˆ ≤ 1 if and only if ∆ ≥ 3 (α− 1) /(2t) and zˆ ≤ 1 if and only if
∆ ≥ 6 (α− 1) /[3t− (α− 1)]. A simple comparison between ∆ ≥ 3 (α− 1) /t, ∆ ≥ 3 (α− 1) /(2t)
and ∆ ≥ 6 (α− 1) /(3t)− (α− 1) reveals that the critical ∆ that satisfies wˆ, zˆ ∈ [0, 1] (under the
assumption that t > α − 1) is given by ∆ = 3 (α− 1) /t. It is, thus, the case that the tax rates,
given in (13), τ∗fA = 2∆/3− (α− 1) /t > 0 and τ∗fB = ∆/3− (α− 1) /t > 0, are the equilibrium
ones if ∆ ≥ 3(α − 1)/t. In such an equilibrium, the revenue functions, excluding the cost of the
public good, are given by
RA(xA, xB) =
[2∆t− 3 (α− 1)]2
9t [∆t− 2 (α− 1)] and RB(xA, xB) =
[∆t− 3 (α− 1)]2
9t [∆t− 2 (α− 1)] . (A.1.4)
Firm side tips in favor of jurisdiction A. Consider now the case 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 3 (α− 1) /t. In
this case there is an equilibrium under which
τ∗fA =
α− 1
t
and τ∗fB = 0. (A.1.5)
To show that this is an equilibrium we proceed as follows. Given that ∆ ≤ 3 (α− 1) /t the firm
side tips in favor of A (wˆ from (A.1.3) becomes zero). Suppose that τ∗fB = 0. The level of
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jurisdiction A’s tax rate under which tipping happens is the one that sets nfA − nfB = 1, and
is given by τ∗fA = (α − 1)/t. In this equilibrium, following from (8), nsA − nsB = (α − 1)/t < 1
(given the assumption t > (α − 1)), implying that jurisdiction B’s shopper share will never be
zero. Now, for (A.1.5) to be an equilibrium, jurisdiction B must have no incentive to deviate
from τ∗fB = 0. Indeed this is the case since the share of firms located in B is zero. Jurisdiction
A, too, has no incentive to deviate from τ∗fA = (α − 1)/t by lowering the level of the tax, since
by doing so it cannot increase the number of firms located there. What remains to be checked is
whether jurisdiction A has the incentive to raise its tax.
To show that it does not, suppose, first, that ∆ ∈ (2 (α− 1) /t, 3 (α− 1) /t]. Under this range of
∆ jurisdiction A’s tax rate response will be continuous and given by the derivatives of nfA and
nsA from (10) and (11) with respect to τfA. Following from (A.1.1), the first order condition of
jurisdiction A evaluated at τfA = (α− 1)/t and assuming that τfB = 0, gives
∂RA
∂τfA
¯¯¯¯
τfA=α−1t and τfB=0
=
∆t− 3 (α− 1)
∆t− 2 (α− 1) , (A.1.6)
which is strictly negative when ∆ ∈ (2 (α− 1) /t, 3 (α− 1) /t]. Since under this ∆ the revenue
function is concave, jurisdiction A cannot profit by increasing the level of the tax.
Suppose now that ∆ ≤ 2 (α− 1) /t. In this case a small increase in τfA will result in jurisdiction
A loosing all firms. The reason behind this is the following. At the candidate equilibrium (A.1.5),
we have wˆ = 0 (all firms locate in jurisdiction A). Suppose τfA increases. From (4), jurisdiction
A will, initially, loose 1∆ firms to jurisdiction B. Given this, the firm diﬀerence between the two
jurisdictions increases by 2∆ . This, in turn, implies, following from (8), that jurisdiction A will
loose (α−1)2t
2
∆ shoppers to jurisdiction B. This implies that the shopper diﬀerence between the
two jurisdictions will increase by (α−1)t
2
∆ . As a consequence, in addition to the initial
1
∆ ,
2(α−1)
∆2t
more firms will be lost. It is straightforward to show that his process continues to infinity and is
described by the series
∞X
k=1
1
∆k
µ
2 (α− 1)
t
¶k−1
, (A.1.7)
This series gives the eﬀect of a tax change on the number of firms that join jurisdiction A. Using
the ratio test, this series is convergent only if ∆ > 2 (α− 1) /t.40 If this condition is satisfied,
then it can be shown that the series converges to t∆t−2(α−1) . Notice that this is the absolute of
the derivative of nfA, from (10), with respect to τfA.
If now ∆ ≤ 2 (α− 1) /t then the series diverges. In this case, a small tax increase results in
jurisdiction A loosing all the firms. Hence, such a deviation is not profitable. This proves that
40According to the ratio test, if
ak+1ak
 approaches a number less than one as k approaches infinity, then
S
k ak
converges. Otherwise, the series diverges. In the case we analyze we have that
L = lim
k→∞

ak+1
ak
 =
2 (α− 1)
t∆
, (A.1.8)
and so L < 1 if and only if ∆ > 2 (α− 1) /t.
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(A.1.5) is indeed an equilibrium. The revenue functions, excluding the cost of the public good,
in this equilibrium are given by
RA =
α− 1
t
and RB = 0. (A.1.9)
Collecting the intervals of ∆ and the corresponding optimal responses one arrives at the tax rates,
shares and revenue functions given in Proposition 1. ¤
A.2 Characterization of jurisdiction B’s net revenue function (A.2.10)
For the proof of proposition 2 (see Appendix A.4), we first need to determine the best-response
of B (the follower) for any xA. For this reason, in this and the next Appendix, we characterize
the net revenue function of jurisdiction B, given by
RB (xA, xB) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
[∆t−3(α−1)]2
9t[∆t−2(α−1)] −
x2B
2 if ∆ ≥
3(α−1)
t (Region 1)
−x
2
B
2 if 0 ≤ ∆ ≤
3(α−1)
t (Region 2)
α−1
t −
x2B
2 if −
3(α−1)
t ≤ ∆ < 0 (Region 3)
[−2∆t−3(α−1)]2
9t[−∆t−2(α−1)] −
x2B
2 if ∆ ≤ −
3(α−1)
t (Region 4).
(A.2.10)
As noted in text, (A.2.10) is simply a relabeling of (22). A word of caution is in order here. In
this and the Appendices that follow, to avoid clustering the exposition, the discussion regarding
B’s net revenue function utilizes Figure 1 which refers to the net revenue function of A. This is
feasible because the two revenue functions are identical after a relabeling of the variables. We
use the properties of (A.2.10) in the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A.4.
In region 1, jurisdiction B is the low public good jurisdiction and the firm side is shared (no
tipping). In this case, the net revenue function is decreasing. The reason is that a reduction in
xB, given that the degree of vertical diﬀerentiation is non-negative, has three (positive) eﬀects on
the revenues of this jurisdiction. Firstly, a higher degree of vertical diﬀerentiation implies that,
following (17), tax competition is less intense and, consequently, jurisdiction B can levy a higher
tax (tax competition eﬀect). Secondly, the tax base of jurisdiction B, following (19), expands
as vertical diﬀerentiation increases (market share eﬀect). Despite the fact that jurisdiction B
provides a lower level of the public good and its tax goes up, it is still able to attract a higher
share of firms. This is because, following (17), the rival jurisdiction raises its tax by more (than
jurisdiction B) as the degree of diﬀerentiation increases, which, in the presence of cross-group
externalities, results in some firms leaving jurisdiction A and locating in the low public good
jurisdiction B. Thirdly, a reduction in xB reduces the total cost of the public good (public
good cost eﬀect). Region 1 gives the standard result of the one-sided model of Zissimos and
Wooders (2008) that, in order to soften the harmful eﬀect of tax competition, the low public
good jurisdiction opts for a high degree of vertical diﬀerentiation. The present specification,
however, introduces an additional eﬀect, the market share eﬀect, that is not present in one-sided
frameworks.
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In region 2, jurisdiction B is the low public good jurisdiction and the firm side has tipped in favor
of jurisdiction A. Jurisdiction B, in this case, has no tax revenues and its net revenue function is
given by RB(xA, 0) = −x2B/2, and is decreasing in xB.
As shown in Figure 1 (and verified by equation (A.2.10)) moving from positive values of vertical
diﬀerentiation to negative ones (and so jurisdiction B from low public good jurisdiction becomes
the high public good one) involves a discontinuity in the net revenue function of jurisdiction B at
the point where vertical diﬀerentiation is zero, that is ∆ = 0. To see this, recall from Proposition
1 that with zero vertical diﬀerentiation, and as long as the cross-group externality exists, and
thus α > 1, jurisdiction B sets a zero tax whereas jurisdiction A is able to sustain a strictly
positive one. In this case, the market is tipped in favor of jurisdiction A, the jurisdiction with the
largest pool of shoppers, and, consequently, firms. The presence of the shopper side introduces a
second source of diﬀerentiation on top of the diﬀerentiation in public goods provision. Therefore,
even when ∆ = 0, jurisdiction A can sustain a strictly positive tax because it attracts more
shoppers. With the firm market tipped in favor of jurisdiction A, jurisdiction B’s net revenues,
following (A.2.10), are given by RB (xA, xB) = −x2B/2. If now jurisdiction B changes its public
good provision marginally by, say, dxB > 0, then, with xA = xB and ∆ = −dxB < 0, jurisdiction
B becomes the high public good jurisdiction and the firm side tips in its favor (jurisdiction B
moves into region 3 in Figure 1). The net revenue function for jurisdiction B, in this case,
jumps to RB (xA, xB) = (α− 1) /t − x2B/2 and, interestingly, its magnitude depends positively
on the level of the cross-group externality α (and negatively on the cost of traveling t). This
increase in revenues reflects the fact that, as noted earlier, the jurisdiction who has attracted all
firms increases its tax rate as α increases. Such benefit of course disappears (and so does the
discontinuity) if the cross-group externality is not present in the sense that α = 1.
In region 3, jurisdiction B is the high public good jurisdiction, and so ∆ ≡ xA − xB < 0,
and the firm side has tipped in its favor. As we mentioned above, the net revenue function
jumps to RB(xA, xB) = (α− 1)/t− x2B/2. After the jump, the revenue function decreases up to
xB = xA + 3 (α− 1) /t.
In region 4, jurisdiction B is the high public good jurisdiction and the firm side is shared (no
tipping). Though the precise details are presented in the next Section, it suﬃces to say that, in
this case, the net revenue function of jurisdiction B admits a number of shapes, ranging from
inverse U-shaped to everywhere decreasing. (In order not to over burden the figure, Figure 1
depicts only one possible shape, the inverse U -shape). There is a simple intuition for why this
is the case. Consider two extreme cases, depending on the threshold xA + 3(α − 1)/t, that xB
must exceed for this region to arise: One in which the threshold is suﬃciently high and one in
which it is suﬃciently low. In the former case, which implies that xA and/or α are high, public
good expenditure on part of jurisdiction B is high. In this case the public good cost eﬀect will
dominate the other two eﬀects identified in the discussion of region 1 above, generating a net
revenue function that is everywhere decreasing. In the latter case, however, which arises when xA
and α are low, this will not be the case. For low levels of xB the tax competition eﬀect dominates
the public good cost eﬀect and the market share eﬀect and, consequently, the net revenue function
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has an increasing part up to the point where the public good cost eﬀect dominates, as Figure
1 illustrates. There are, of course, since the threshold for which this region arises depends on
xA and the indirect externality α, intermediate cases which give rise to other shapes of the net
revenues function.41
The next Appendix characterizes the shape of the net revenue function of jurisdiction B in region
4. ¤
A.3 Shape of jurisdiction B’s net revenue function in region 4 of (A.2.10)
This Appendix characterizes the shape of the net revenue function of jurisdiction B in region
4 of (A.2.10), where jurisdiction B is the high public good jurisdiction and the firm market is
shared. This occurs when xB ≥ xA+3 (α− 1) /t or, equivalently, −∆ ≥ 3 (α− 1) /t. It simplifies
matters if it is assumed that xA = 0 and so xB ≥ 3 (α− 1) /t. Once the properties of the net
revenue function are established for xA = 0 one, then, can easily allow for xA > 0 and complete
the characterization. This is done as follows. The net revenue function is equal to gross revenue
minus cost. Following (16), the gross revenue depends only on the degree of vertical diﬀerentiation
∆ and not on the individual values of the xA and xB. This implies that the restriction xA = 0 is
without any loss of generality, as far as the gross revenue is concerned. In addition, the threshold
above which the firm side is shared only depends on ∆ as well. The cost side of jurisdiction
B does, of course, depend on the value of the xA, because xB must exceed a higher threshold,
namely xA + 3 (α− 1) /t, instead of 3 (α− 1) /t. This implies that if xA > 0 the cost is higher
and thus it will be ‘less likely’ for the net revenue function to have an increasing part. If it does,
the value of revenue will be lower than the value when xA = 0. The proof of Proposition 2 makes
use of this argument.
Given that xA = 0, jurisdiction B’s first order condition, following (A.2.10), is given by
∂RB(0, xB)
∂xB
=
[2txB − 3 (α− 1)] [2txB − 5 (α− 1)]
9 [txB − 2 (α− 1)]2
− xB. (A.3.11)
(A.3.11) has two components, the marginal revenue, given by
MR (0, xB) =
[2txB − 3 (α− 1)] [2txB − 5 (α− 1)]
9 [txB − 2 (α− 1)]2
, (A.3.12)
and the marginal cost given by
MC (0, xB) = xB. (A.3.13)
The characterization proceeds by establishing the curvature, and the relative positions, of the
marginal revenue and marginal cost functions in, respectively, (A.3.12) and (A.3.13).
It is straightforward to verify that
∂MR(0, xB)
∂xB
=
2t (α− 1)2
9 [txB − 2 (α− 1)]3
> 0 > − 2[t(α− 1)]
2
3[txB − 2(α− 1)]4
=
∂2MR(0, xB)
∂x2B
, (A.3.14)
41The characterization of the net revenue function of jurisdiction B, used also in the proof of Proposition 2, is
given in Appendix A.3.
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and so MR(0, xB) is increasing and concave in xB.
Evaluating–the left hand side of–(A.3.14) and the derivative of (A.3.13) at xB = 3 (α− 1) /t
gives
∂MR(0, 3(α− 1)/t)
∂xB
=
2t
9(α− 1) and
∂MC(0, 3(α− 1)/t)
∂xB
= 1, (A.3.15)
and so
∂MR (0, 3(α− 1)/t)
∂xB
=
2t
9(α− 1) ≷
∂MC(0, 3(α− 1)/t)
∂xB
= 1 if and only if α ≶ 1 + 2t/9.
(A.3.16)
Notice also that evaluating (A.3.12) and (A.3.13) at xB = 3 (α− 1) /t gives, respectively,
MR
µ
0,
3(α− 1)
t
¶
=
3
9
and MC
µ
0,
3(α− 1)
t
¶
=
3(α− 1)
t
, (A.3.17)
and so
MR
µ
0,
3(α− 1)
t
¶
=
3
9
≷MC
µ
0,
3(α− 1)
t
¶
=
3(α− 1)
t
if and only if α ≶ 1 + t/9. (A.3.18)
(A.3.18), in conjunction with (A.3.16), shows that the construction of the revenue function RB(·)
crucially depends on α and t. It will be shown that there are three cases to be considered,
depending on the strength of the cross-group externality α. In case 1, the marginal revenue
function starts above the marginal cost function and the two functions intersect once and so
there is a unique maximum. In case 2, the marginal revenue function starts below, and intersects
twice, the marginal cost function implying that the net revenue function exhibits first a local
minimum and then a maximum. In case 3, the two functions never intersect implying that the
net revenue function is everywhere decreasing. We now explore these three cases.
Case 1 (α ≤ 1+ t/9). Notice first that following (A.3.16)–when α < 1+2t/9 and at xB = 3(α−
1)/t–the function MR(·) is steeper than the function MC(·). It is also the case that, following
(A.3.18), the functionMR(·) starts out aboveMC(·). Given now that, following (A.3.14),MR(·)
is increasing and strictly concave in xB, and that MC(·) is increasing and linear in xB, it must
be the case that MR(·) and MC(·) intersect only once in the interval [3 (α− 1) /t,∞). At the
point of intersection it must be that the first order condition is zero, that is ∂RB/∂xB = 0. To
the left of the intersection point, since MR(·) > MC(·), it must be the case that ∂RB/∂xB > 0,
whereas to the right, since MR(·) < MC(·), it must be that ∂RB/∂xB < 0. Panel A of Figure 2
depicts this case.
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Case 2 (1 + t/9 < α < 1 + ζt).42 When α > 1 + t/9, following (A.3.18), the function MR(·)
starts out below MC(·). Suppose also that α < 1 + 2t/9 and so, following (A.3.16), MR(·) is
steeper than the function MC(·). In this case the function MR(·) may intersect MC(·), at least
for xB’s close enough to 3 (α− 1) /t. This case establishes such possibility.
The function MR(·), given that it is increasing and strictly concave, intersects MC(·) if there
exists a uniquely admissible level of public good, denoted by x¯B, such that the slope of MR(·)
is equal to that of MC(·), when evaluated at x¯B, and at this x¯B it is the case that MR (·) lies
aboveMC (·). Using, the left hand side of, (A.3.14) and the fact that the slope ofMC(·) is unity,
it is the case that such x¯B exists and is given by
x¯B =
3
rh
6t (α− 1)2
i
+ 6 (α− 1)
3t
. (A.3.19)
What remains to be shown now is that the function MR (·) lies above MC (·) when both are
evaluated at the x¯B given by (A.3.19). Substituting (A.3.19) into (A.3.12) and (A.3.13) reveals
that this is the case as long as
α < 1 + ζt, (A.3.20)
42The value of ζ is given below.
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where
ζ =
3
¡
−1499 + 512
√
15
¢ 2
3 − 357 + 55 3
q¡
−1499 + 512
√
15
¢
288 3
q¡
−1499 + 512
√
15
¢ ≈ 0.114 87.
The implication, if α ≥ 1 + ζt, is that MR(·) and MC(·) never intersect. In this case the MR(·)
function lies below the MC(·) and so ∂RB/∂xB < 0 for all xB > 3 (α− 1) /t.
Collecting the intervals of α, it is the case that as long as 1 + t/9 < α < 1 + ζt < 1 + 2t/9, MR
and MC intersect twice and, therefore, the first order condition holds with equality, in the sense
that ∂RA/∂xB = 0, twice in the interval [3 (α− 1) /t,∞). The first intersection gives a local
minimum whereas the second gives a local maximum. Panel B of Figure 2 illustrates this case.
Case 3 (α ≥ 1 + ζt). Now suppose that α ≥ 1 + ζt. Given the analysis of case 2, MR(·) starts
below MC(·) and they never intersect. This implies that the net revenue function is decreasing
in the relevant interval. Panel C of Figure 2 illustrates this possibility.
Summarizing the above discussion, under the assumption that xA = 0, we have that (under case
1) if α ≤ 1 + t/9 the net revenue function is inverse U -shaped for xB ≥ 3 (α− 1) /t, where it
attains a unique local maximum. If (under case 2) 1+ t/9 < α < 1+ ζt the net revenue function
exhibits a sideways S shape for xB ≥ 3 (α− 1) /t, where it attains a unique local maximum. If
(under case 3) α ≥ 1 + ζt, the net revenue function is everywhere decreasing. ¤
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of this proposition proceeds by determining first, for given xA, the best response of
jurisdiction B. This, however, requires the determination of the shape of the net revenue function
of jurisdiction B, for any xA. The net revenue function of jurisdiction B has four regions. It
is straightforward to establish the shape of the net revenue function in the first three regions,
as illustrated in Figure 1 and discussed in Appendix A.2. Region 4, however, is a bit more
complicated since, as shown in Appendix A.3, it exhibits a number of diﬀerent shapes. The rest
of the proof of this Proposition focuses more–relative to the other regions–on region 4 and thus
utilizes Appendix A.3. Then, given the best response of jurisdiction B, the proof proceeds by
determining the optimal choice of jurisdiction A.
High cross-group externality (α ≥ 1 + 2t/9). We fix xA and we find the best response of
jurisdiction B. Following from Appendix A.3, and given that α ≥ 1+2t/9 (and so case 3 applies),
the net revenue function of jurisdiction B in region 4 of (A.2.10) is decreasing, given that xA = 0.
Now we allow xA to take any value. When xA > 0 the net revenue of jurisdiction B must still be
decreasing in region 4. The reason for this is that in order for jurisdiction B to be in that region
it must expend more than xA+3(α−1)/t, which is higher than the threshold when xA = 0. This
implies that the cost is higher, while on the other hand the gross revenue only depends on the
degree of vertical diﬀerentiation ∆ = xA − xB in that region. The implication of this is that if
the net revenue function is decreasing in region 4 when xA = 0 it must also be decreasing when
xA > 0. To put it diﬀerently, in panel C of Figure 2, the function MR horizontally shifts to the
31
right by xA, which implies that if there is no intersection between MR and MC when xA = 0,
there must not be one when xA > 0. Combining all four regions of (A.2.10) (see also Figure
1, with the diﬀerence that the net revenue function in region 4 instead of inverse U-shaped is
decreasing) the best response of jurisdiction xB is to set either xB = 0 or to marginally leapfrog
jurisdiction A by setting xB = xA+ ε.43 If it sets xB = xA+ ε, and so it becomes the high public
good jurisdiction, its revenue is arbitrarily close to RB(xA, xA + ε) = (α − 1)/t − (xA)2/2. If it
sets xB = 0 its revenue depends on where xA is located.
First, suppose that xA ≥ 3 (α− 1) /t. In this case jurisdiction B does not have an incentive
to deviate from xB = 0–with strictly positive revenues (since the firm side is shared), fol-
lowing region 1 in (A.2.10)–to xB = xA + ε and so become a high public good jurisdiction
(as in region 3 of (A.2.10)). To see this, suppose that xA = 3 (α− 1) /t. In this case the
net revenue of jurisdiction B at xB = xA + ε–following region 3 in (A.2.10)–is arbitrarily
close to RB(3 (α− 1) /t, 0)) = (α − 1)/(t) − [9 (α− 1)2 /(2t2)], which is negative if and only if
α ≥ 1 + 2t/9. Clearly, since, in this case, net revenues are decreasing in xA, higher xA than
3 (α− 1) /t will reduce the net revenue at xB = xA + ε even further. These arguments suggest
that if xA ≥ 3 (α− 1) /t jurisdiction B’s best response is to set xB = 0.
Second, suppose that xA ≤ 3 (α− 1) /t and so the market has tipped in favor of jurisdiction A,
provided that A is the high public good jurisdiction, (region 2 in (A.2.10)). If jurisdiction B
sets xB = 0, its net revenue is RB(xA, 0) = 0, a consequence of the firm side tipping in favor of
jurisdiction A. If it sets xB = xA + ε, and so it becomes the high public good jurisdiction, its
revenue is arbitrarily close to RB(xA, xA + ε) = (α − 1)/t − (xA)2/2. Clearly, such a deviation
is profitable if and only if xA <
p
2 (α− 1)/
√
t. If xA ≥
p
2 (α− 1)/
√
t, jurisdiction B does not
want to deviate from xB = 0. Moreover,
p
2 (α− 1)/
√
t ≤ 3 (α− 1) /t if and only if α ≥ 1+2t/9.
These arguments suggest that if xA ≥
p
2 (α− 1)/
√
t, then jurisdiction B’s best response is to set
xB = 0. If xA <
p
2 (α− 1)/
√
t, then jurisdiction B’s best response is to set xB = xA+ ε. Given
jurisdiction B’s best response, jurisdiction A’s best response is to set either xA =
p
2 (α− 1)/
√
t
or xA = 0. The reason for this is that any xA >
p
2 (α− 1)/
√
t is suboptimal because in such a
case the net revenue function of jurisdiction A is decreasing, given that xB = 0, following from
the fact that the net revenue function of A is decreasing. This can be seen by looking at regions
3 and 4 in (A.2.10) after we switch the identities of the two jurisdictions, that is jurisdiction B
becomes A. On the other hand, if xA <
p
2 (α− 1)/
√
t the best response of A, given that it will
become the low public good jurisdiction, is to set xA = 0. Both choices yield the same net revenue
(zero) for the leader, suggesting that there are two candidate equilibria that involve firm tipping,
since in both ∆ < 3 (α− 1) /t: i) x∗A =
p
2 (α− 1)/
√
t and x∗B = 0 and ii) x
∗
A = 0 and x
∗
B = ε.
The second one, however, is not an equilibrium given the discontinuity at ∆ = 0. The follower
would always want to deviate by lowering xB and when xB = 0 it will want to raise xB. The first
43The term ‘best response’ is used loosely in this proof. The reason for this is that, technically speaking, the
best response function of jurisdiction B is not well-defined given the discontinuity at ∆ = 0 and the fact that xB
is a continuous variable. This is because a maximum in the neighborhood of ∆ = 0 does not exist. Nevertheless,
this does not aﬀect the proof in any significant way. The approach taken here identifies a candidate equilibrium
and then shows that it is indeed an equilibrium and it is unique.
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candidate is an equilibrium. It is easy to verify, given the analysis, that neither jurisdiction wishes
to deviate. Furthermore, the equilibrium is unique. Notice that x∗A =
p
2 (α− 1)/
√
t > 4/9 and
so public good supply is higher than in the one-sided market.
Medium cross-group externality (1+ ζt 6 α < 1+2t/9).44 In this case, too, the net revenue
function of jurisdiction B is decreasing in xB ≥ 3 (α− 1) /t when xA = 0 (we are still in case 3
of A.3)) and thus, as argued above, it will still be decreasing with xA > 0.
As in the case of the high cross-group externality examined above, the best response of jurisdiction
xB is to set either xB = 0 or to marginally leapfrog jurisdiction A by setting xB = xA + ε. If it
sets xB = xA+ε, and so it becomes the high public good jurisdiction, its net revenue is arbitrarily
close to RB(xA, xA+ ε) = (α−1)/t− (xA)2/2. If it sets xB = 0 its net revenue depends on where
xA is located.
First, we assume that xA ≥ 3 (α− 1) /t. If jurisdiction B sets xB = 0, its net revenue, given that
the firm side is shared, is RB (xA, 0) = [xAt− 3 (α− 1)]2 /[9t (xAt− 2 (α− 1))]. If jurisdiction
B leapfrogs jurisdiction A it must choose xB = xA + ε and the net revenue is arbitrarily close
to RB (xB = xA) = (α − 1)/t − (xA)2 /2. It can be easily verified that RB (xA, 0) is increasing
in xA (provided that xA ≥ 3 (α− 1) /t) and RB (xA, xB = xA) is decreasing in xA. Moreover,
RB (xA, 0) = 0 at xA = 3 (α− 1) /t and RB (xB = xA) = 0 at xA =
p
2 (α− 1)/
√
t. Finally,p
2 (α− 1)/
√
t > 3 (α− 1) /t, since α < 1+ 2t/9. Thus, there exists a unique threshold, denoted
by x¯ ∈
³
3 (α− 1) /t,
p
2 (α− 1)/
√
t
´
, such that a deviation from xB = 0 to xB = xA + ε is
unprofitable, for any xA ≥ x¯. In addition, the threshold x¯ increases as α increases (holding t
fixed). (This can be seen by diﬀerentiating RB (xA, xB = 0) and RB (xB = xB) with respect to
α). These arguments suggest that jurisdiction B’s best response, when xA ≥ 3 (α− 1) /t, is to
set xB = 0 if xA ≥ x¯ and to set xB = xA + ε if xA < x¯.
Second, we assume that xA ≤ 3 (α− 1) /t. If jurisdiction B sets xB = 0, its net revenue, given that
the firm side tips in favor of A, is RB (xA, 0) = 0. If jurisdiction B leapfrogs jurisdiction A it must
choose xB = xA+ε and the net revenue is arbitrarily close to RB (xB = xA) = (α−1)/t−(xA)2 /2,
which is strictly positive given that α < 1 + 2t/9. Hence, jurisdiction B’s best response when
xA ≤ 3(α− 1)/t is to set xB = xA + ε.
Jurisdiction A’s optimal response is either to set xA = x¯ (with RA(xA = x¯, xB = 0) > 0) in which
case it will be the high public good jurisdiction, or to set xA = 0 (with RA(xA = 0, xB = 0) = 0),
in which case it will be the low public good jurisdiction. (As we discussed in the high externality
case above, it is suboptimal for jurisdiction A to set xA > x¯ or any xA < x¯ other than zero). We
can show that RA (xA = x¯, xB = 0) > 0 as follows. The diﬀerence in the net revenues between
the high and the low public good jurisdictions when xB = 0 and xA ≥ 3 (α− 1) /t is equal to
xA/3− x2A/2. This diﬀerence is greater than zero if and only if xA ≤ 2/3. This inequality holds
since
p
2 (α− 1)/
√
t ≤ 2/3 when α < 1 + 2t/9. Since the net revenue of the low public good
jurisdiction is strictly positive, when xB = 0 and xA ≥ 3 (α− 1) /t, it must be that the net
44Where the value of ζ is given in Appendix A.3.
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revenue of the high public good jurisdiction is also strictly positive. Therefore, jurisdiction A
(the leader) chooses x∗A = x¯ ∈
³
3 (α− 1) /t,
p
2 (α− 1)/
√
t
´
and jurisdiction B (the follower)
chooses x∗B = 0. Based on the above analysis, neither jurisdiction has an incentive to deviate.
In this equilibrium the firm side does not tip and, it is straightforward to verify that, x¯ > 4/9,
which implies that the degree of vertical diﬀerentiation is higher than in the one-sided model.
Low cross-group externality (1 ≤ α < 1 + ζt). In Appendix A.3 we showed that, when
α < 1+ζt, the net revenue function of jurisdiction B attains a local maximum in [3 (α− 1) /t,∞),
assuming that xA = 0 (cases 1 and 2 in A.3). The same will be true for jurisdiction A if we
switch the labels of the two jurisdictions. So, the net revenue function of jurisdiction A attains a
local maximum x˜A in [3 (α− 1) /t,∞), assuming that xB = 0, where x˜A satisfies the first order
condition for a sharing equilibrium, given by
∂RA(xA, 0)
∂xA
=
[2txA − 3 (α− 1)] [2txA − 5 (α− 1)]
9 [txA − 2 (α− 1)]2
− xA = 0. (A.4.21)
In this case it is possible that an investment on part of jurisdiction A in [3 (α− 1) /t,∞)maximizes
its net revenue function (given that jurisdiction B chooses xB = 0) and prevents jurisdiction B
from leapfrogging and becoming the high public good jurisdiction. This was not the case in
the previous two cases, where a public good investment on part of the leader was made solely
for the purpose of preventing the follower from leapfrogging and becoming the high public good
jurisdiction (since, due to high levels of the cross-group externality, the net revenue function of
the leader was decreasing in [3 (α− 1) /t,∞)).
From the discussion in the medium externality case, there exists an x¯ ∈ (3 (α− 1) /t,
p
2 (α− 1)/
√
t),
such that jurisdiction B does not want to set xB = xA + ε, for all xA ≥ x¯. Also, RB(xA, xB) is
decreasing for xB > x˜A. This can be seen as follows. When xB = 0, RA(xA, xB) decreases when
xA > x˜A (since the local maximum is attained at x˜A and beyond that point the cost dominates).
Now jurisdiction B is the high public good jurisdiction (since xB > x˜A), but its net revenue func-
tion must be decreasing beyond x˜A because the cost is now even higher and ∆ has not changed
(everything shifts up by x˜A). These arguments suggest that the best response of jurisdiction B is
to set xB = 0 if xA ≥ max {x˜A, x¯} and if xA < max {x˜A, x¯} to set either xB = xA+ε or xB = x∗B,
where x∗B satisfies the first order condition in [3 (α− 1) /t+ xA,∞).
Jurisdiction A, in turn, will either set xA = 0 or xA = max {x˜A, x¯}. This can be explained as
follows. If xA < max {x˜A, x¯}, and given B’s best response, A will become the low public good
jurisdiction and the best it can do is to set xA = 0. On the other hand, any xA strictly greater
than max {x˜A, x¯} is suboptimal. In this case, B’s best response is xB = 0. If max {x˜A, x¯} = x˜A,
the sub-optimality follows from the fact that x˜A is a local maximum and the fact, from A.3, that
the net revenue function of A is either a sideways S or inverse U -shaped in this region. Hence,
any xA > x˜A will lower the net revenue. If max {x˜A, x¯} = x¯, then, given the above argument,
we are already on the decreasing part of A’s net revenue function, but such an over-investment
is needed to prevent the rival from becoming the high public good jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
xA > x¯ is excessive and consequently xA = x¯.
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Jurisdiction A is better oﬀ following the latter strategy, that is, x∗A = max {x˜A, x¯}, and becoming
the high public good jurisdiction, while x∗B = 0. When the firm side does not tip (which is the case)
the diﬀerence in net revenue between the high and low public good jurisdictions is xA/3− x2A/2,
when xB = 0. Jurisdiction A is better oﬀ becoming the high public good jurisdiction if and only
if xA/3 ≥ x2A/2 which implies xA ≤ 2/3.
Moreover, it can be shown using (A.4.21) that the maximum x˜A is equal to 4/9 (when α → 1)
and, as showed in the medium externality above, the maximum x¯ is when α is as high as possible,
which in the present case means arbitrarily close to 1 + ζt. In such a case, x¯ is arbitrarily close
to .465. Both are less than 2/3, so jurisdiction A is better oﬀ becoming the high public good
jurisdiction by setting x∗A = max {x˜A, x¯}. Jurisdiction B chooses x∗B = 0. Based on the above
analysis, neither jurisdiction has an incentive to deviate. Finally, for high α, xA = x¯ > 4/9 and
for low α, xA = x˜A < 4/9. ¤
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